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Rapid	fuel	switching	from	coal	to	natural		1	
gas	through	effective	carbon	pricing	2	
	3	
Grant	Wilson	and	Iain	Staffell	4	
Abstract	5	
Britain’s	carbon	emissions	fell	by	an	extraordinary	6%	in	2016	due	to	cleaner	electricity	production.		6	
This	was	not	due	to	a	surge	 in	 low-carbon	nuclear	or	renewable	sources;	 instead	 it	was	the	much-7	
overlooked	impact	of	fuel	switching	from	coal	to	natural	gas	generation.		This	Perspective	considers	8	
the	 enabling	 conditions	 in	 Britain	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 rapid	 fuel	 switching	 in	 other	 coal-reliant	9	
countries.	 	Spare	generation	and	fuel	supply-chain	capacity	must	already	exist	for	fuel	switching	to	10	
deliver	 rapid	 carbon	 savings,	 and	 to	 avoid	 further	 high-carbon	 infrastructure	 lock-in.	 	 More	11	
important	 is	 the	 political	 will	 to	 alter	 the	 marketplace	 and	 incentivise	 this	 switch,	 for	 example	12	
through	 a	 strong	 and	 stable	 carbon	 price.	 	With	 the	 right	 incentives,	 fuel	 switching	 in	 the	 power	13	
sector	could	rapidly	achieve	in	the	order	of	1	GtCO2	saving	per	year	(3%	of	global	emissions),	buying	14	
precious	time	to	slow	the	growth	in	cumulative	carbon.	15	
	16	
Introduction	17	
Global	carbon	emissions	from	fossil	 fuels	stand	at	almost	37	GtCO2	and	have	grown	by	an	average	18	
2.4%	 per	 year	 so	 far	 this	 century1.	 	While	 emissions	 had	 stabilised	 between	 2014	 and	 2016	 they	19	
appear	to	be	increasing	once	again,	 intensifying	the	need	to	reduce	global	fossil	 fuel	consumption.		20	
Switching	away	from	fossil	fuels	is	recognised	as	a	‘key	mitigation	strategy’2	of	‘crucial	importance’3	21	
in	the	transport	sector,	but	switching	between	fossil	fuels	in	the	power	sector	lacks	such	recognition4	22	
as	it	is	incompatible	with	longer-term	deep	decarbonisation.	23	
Power	sector	decarbonisation	has	received	most	attention	with	the	rollout	of	renewables,	especially	24	
wind	and	solar,	which	have	grown	twenty-fold	 in	the	last	15	years	to	reach	5%	of	global	electricity	25	
generation5.	Carbon	capture	and	storage	(CCS)	is	often	considered	an	essential	component	of	least-26	
cost	 decarbonisation6,7;	 however,	 it	 may	 take	 another	 three	 decades	 to	 achieve	 a	 10%	 share	 of	27	
electricity	 generation8,	 and	 “expectations	 for	 CCS	 are	 very	 low	 in	 the	 current	 environment”9	 after	28	
continued	delays	and	cancellations10.	With	cumulative	carbon	emissions	being	a	major	determinant	29	
of	climate	change11,	any	early	opportunities	to	reduce	emissions	within	months	rather	than	decades	30	
deserve	 attention.	 	 Fuel	 switching	 between	 fossil	 fuels	 cannot	 be	 a	 long-term	option	 as	 electrical	31	
2	
generation	from	unabated	natural	gas	still	emits	around	four	tenths	that	of	coal12;	and	if	shale	gas	is	32	
used,	upstream	methane	emissions	may	add	a	further	25%	to	its	carbon	intensity13.	33	
However,	Britain	has	recently	demonstrated	the	short-term	impact	of	fuel	switching.		Displacing	coal	34	
with	natural	gas	reduced	per-capita	annual	emissions	by	400	kgCO2	between	2015	and	2016.	Given	35	
the	long-lived	nature	of	energy	systems	and	their	endemic	inertia,	this	rate	of	change	is	remarkable	36	
in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	major	 accident	 or	 disaster.	 Figure	 1	 puts	 these	 changes	 in	 context;	 against	37	
market-led	fuel	switching	in	China	and	the	US,	renewables	deployment	in	Germany,	and	incremental	38	
efficiency	 improvements	 in	 Poland.	 The	 unprecedented	 deployment	 of	 nuclear	 power	 lowered	39	
French	carbon	 intensity	by	40	g/kWh	each	year	 for	a	decade	 (1977–1986)14,15.	 	 Fuel	 switching	 can	40	
proceed	faster,	but	not	so	far:	Britain’s	carbon	intensity	fell	by	85	g/kWh	in	2016,	but	its	potential	is	41	
close	to	exhaustion	as	coal	is	almost	eliminated.	42	
	43	
Figure	1:	The	 carbon	 intensity	of	electricity	generation	 in	 six	 countries	over	 the	 last	half-century.	 	 Carbon	 intensity	 for	44	
gross	 electricity	 output	 (not	 accounting	 for	 losses	 in	 transmission	and	distribution).	 	 The	 legend	 indicates	 the	 depth	and	45	
duration	of	sustained	reductions	in	emissions	intensity	within	each	country.		Data	from	refs.	14,15.	46	
This	 Perspective	 argues	 that	with	 the	 right	 conditions,	 both	 in	 terms	of	pre-existing	 infrastructure	47	
and	 political	 will,	 switching	 away	 from	 coal	 has	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 the	 rapid	 early	48	
decarbonisation	 of	 power	 systems.	 This	 provides	 immediate	 benefits	 to	 other	 sectors,	 which	 will	49	
decarbonise	faster	through	electrification	due	to	lower	associated	emissions.	50	
Britain’s	power	generation	51	
Coal	was	 the	 largest	 source	of	electricity	generation	 for	 the	 first	hundred	years	of	Britain’s	power	52	
system.	 This	 changed	 in	 the	 early-1990s	 (Figure	 2)	when	 the	 newly-liberalised	market	 invested	 in	53	
combined	cycle	gas	turbines	(CCGTs),	for	reasons	unrelated	to	carbon	mitigation16.	54	
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Figure	2:	Electricity	generation	by	fuel	type	in	three	countries	over	the	last	25	years.	 	 Imports	are	not	included,	waste	is	55	
included	with	biomass.		Between	2014	and	2016	coal	+	lignite	generation	fell	by	5%	in	Germany,	22%	in	the	US	and	70%	in	56	
Britain.		Data	from	refs.	17–20.	57	
This	 ‘dash-for-gas’	 in	Britain	was	not	 replicated	 in	Germany	or	elsewhere	 in	Europe,	and	although	58	
termed	a	‘dash’	it	took	eight	years	(1991–99)	for	new	gas	capacity	to	be	built	and	halve	coal’s	share	59	
of	generation	from	66%	to	34%.	Over	the	last	decade,	the	US	has	shifted	away	from	coal	and	lignite	60	
as	 shale	 gas	 production	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 price	 of	 natural	 gas.	 More	 recently,	 the	61	
combination	of	fuel	switching	and	coal	plant	retirements	in	Britain	has	seen	coal’s	generation	share	62	
fall	three-quarters	to	9%	in	just	four	years	(2012–16);	helping	to	halve	power	sector	emissions	from	63	
158	MtCO2	in	2012	to	78	MtCO2	in	2016.		This	fuel	switch	drove	the	largest	ever	annual	reduction	in	64	
British	power	sector	CO2	emissions21	of	25	MtCO2	in	2016.	65	
Figure	2	shows	that	renewable	generation	expanded	rapidly	over	the	last	decade	to	supply	nearly	a	66	
fifth	of	Britain’s	electricity.	 	However,	the	fall	 in	coal	generation	between	2015	and	2016	was	filled	67	
entirely	by	natural	gas:	coal	output	fell	46	TWh	and	gas	output	increased	43	TWh,	while	zero-carbon	68	
renewables	 changed	 by	 less	 than	 1	 TWh	 due	 to	 underlying	 weather	 conditions22.	 	 For	 context,	69	
Britain’s	switch	from	coal	to	gas	in	2016	was	greater	than	all	other	European	countries	combined23.	70	
If	sustained,	this	rapid	reduction	arguably	puts	Britain	well	ahead	of	its	near-term	carbon	reduction	71	
trajectory,	 as	 it	 could	 now	beat	 its	 carbon	 targets	 for	 2018-22	within	 the	 timeframe	of	 the	2013-72	
2017	 carbon	 budget24.	 However,	 as	 power	 sector	 emissions	 are	 part	 of	 the	 EU	 Emissions	 Trading	73	
Scheme	 (referred	 to	 as	 the	 traded	 sector),	 the	 net	 UK	 carbon	 accounting25	 means	 that	 these	74	
reductions	can	be	‘exported’	from	the	power	sector	as	a	surplus	to	other	parts	of	the	traded	sector	75	
(e.g.	heavy	industry)	potentially	in	other	countries	in	Europe.	Under	agreed	carbon	accounting	rules,	76	
they	 cannot	 be	 allocated	 to,	 or	 purchased	 by	 the	 non-traded	 sectors	 in	 Britain	 (e.g.	 domestic	77	
transport	or	heat)	to	provide	additional	carbon	headroom26.	Nevertheless,	the	significant	reduction	78	
in	 electricity	 carbon	 intensity	 provides	 a	 direct	 benefit	 for	 decarbonising	 these	 sectors	 through	79	
electric	vehicles	and	heat.	80	
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Britain’s	commitment	to	reduce	coal	power	81	
During	the	run	up	to	COP21	 in	Paris,	 the	British	government	began	consulting	on	the	phase-out	of	82	
unabated	 coal	 by	 202527,28,	 marking	 the	 world’s	 first	 commitment	 to	 abandoning	 coal	 power29.	83	
Although	 this	 deadline	 helps	 frame	 the	 Government’s	 commitment	 to	 decarbonisation,	 there	 is	84	
concern	 that	 early	 power	 station	 closures	 pose	 an	 unacceptable	 security	 of	 supply	 risk.	 From	85	
another	perspective,	it	is	felt	increasingly	important	to	remove	unabated	coal	as	soon	as	is	practical	86	
to	free	up	its	market	share	for	new,	cleaner	generation30.	87	
Scheduling	the	demise	of	Britain’s	coal	generation	has	been	eased	by	the	fleet’s	age	(80%	are	over	88	
30	years	old),	and	tightening	air	pollution	controls	such	as	the	Industrial	Emissions	Directive31.	Half	of	89	
Britain’s	 coal	 capacity	 (14.3	 GW)	 closed	 in	 the	 5	 years	 to	 2017,	 and	 those	 that	 remain	 have	90	
historically	low	utilisation.	Coal	provided	less	than	10%	(28	TWh)	of	electrical	generation	in	2016;	a	91	
smaller	contribution	than	wind	(30.5	TWh)	and	 less	than	solar	generated	 in	Germany	(37.5	TWh)32	92	
over	the	same	year.	93	
Britain	 is	therefore	on	track	to	become	the	first	major	economy	to	transition	away	from	coal	after	94	
centuries	of	production	and	 consumption	 (Figure	3).	 	 The	 latter	 fell	 to	12	Mt	 in	201633,	 levels	not	95	
seen	since	193534.		The	rate	of	this	change	is	unprecedented;	it	took	14	years	for	power	sector	coal	96	
demand	to	increase	from	12	to	28	million	tonnes	per	annum	(1936	to	1950),	but	only	1	year	to	make	97	
the	 reverse	 transition	 (2015	 to	2016).	 	 Britain	 could	be	 the	 first	 country	 to	 leave	 its	 coal	 reserves	98	
unburnt	 in	 the	 ground35,	 and	 in	 November	 2017	 it	 set	 out	 a	 global	 alliance	 to	 end	 coal	 power	99	
generation36.	This	would	have	been	inconceivable	to	policymakers	even	a	generation	ago,	when	coal,	100	
nuclear	and	oil	generation	powered	the	country16.	101	
	102	
Figure	3:	Quantity	of	coal	mined	and	consumed	for	power	generation	in	Britain.	Power	sector	data	from	ref.	17	and	coal	103	
production	data	from	refs.	33	and	34.	104	
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
M
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
 o
f c
oa
l p
er
 y
ea
r
Coal Mined
Consumed 
for power
5	
[BOX	1	starts]	Factors	that	enabled	Britain’s	rapid	fuel	switch	105	
Britain’s	 experience	 of	 fuel	 switching	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 policy	 success,	 albeit	 at	 a	 rate	 that	was	106	
better	than	anticipated.		We	suggest	four	factors	were	necessary	to	achieve	this	rapid	fuel	switch:	107	
• Gas	generation	plants	were	already	built	and	had	spare	underutilised	capacity;	108	
• Existing	fuel	supply	infrastructure	could	cope	with	the	increased	power	sector	gas	demand;	109	
• The	political	will	was	available	to	 intervene	 in	markets	to	 incentivise	the	switch,	penalising	110	
coal	vs.	gas	generation	via	an	effective	carbon	price.	111	
• Coal	and	gas	prices	were	sufficiently	close	so	that	switching	did	not	inflict	large	price	rises	on	112	
electricity	 consumers	 (a	 carbon	 price	 of	 £50/t	was	 needed	 to	 incentivise	 fuel	 switching	 in	113	
2013,	vs.	£16/t	in	2016)12.	114	
Renewable	generation	has	also	rapidly	increased	in	Britain,	lowering	emissions	over	the	last	decade,	115	
but	contrasting	Figure	2	and	Figure	5,	significant	reductions	only	occurred	since	the	2013	increase	in	116	
carbon	prices,	due	to	falling	coal	emissions.	117	
While	putting	a	price	on	carbon	enabled	the	fuel	switch	in	2015	to	be	rapid,	the	development	of	this	118	
policy	 and	 the	 enabling	 conditions	 and	 the	 investment	 in	 generation	 and	 infrastructure	 for	 the	119	
switch	to	take	place	were	decades	in	the	making.		The	EU	Large	Combustion	Plant	Directive	(2001)37	120	
and	 Industrial	Emissions	Directive	 (2010)31	aided	 in	closing	half	of	Britain’s	coal	capacity;	while	the	121	
Climate	 Change	 Act	 (2008)38	 and	 Electricity	 Market	 Reform	 (2013)39	 laid	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	122	
Carbon	Price	Support	scheme.	123	
[BOX	1	ends]	124	
Putting	a	price	on	carbon	125	
Our	view	is	that	the	primary	driver	for	coal’s	substitution	in	2015–16	was	the	higher	price	placed	on	126	
carbon	 emissions.	 	 Since	 2005	 British	 power	 stations	 were	 subject	 to	 the	 EU	 Emissions	 Trading	127	
Scheme	 (ETS)	 but	 it	 delivered	 carbon	 prices	 that	 were	 too	weak	 to	 drive	 sustained	 lower-carbon	128	
investment40–43.	 To	 address	 this,	 Britain	 introduced	 the	 Carbon	 Price	 Support	 (CPS)	 policy	 in	 2013	129	
which	 required	 power-sector	 emitters	 to	 pay	 a	 top-up	 price	 to	 a	 Carbon	 Price	 Floor	 (CPF)	130	
determined	by	policymakers44.	This	aims	to	provide	generators	with	the	certainty	of	a	more	stable	131	
(but	higher)	price	of	CO2	than	delivered	by	the	EU-wide	market	alone.	132	
This	CPS	policy	is	still	subject	to	regulatory	risk	as	the	floor	price	can	be	changed.		Its	initial	trajectory	133	
was	rising	towards	£70/tCO2	in	2030;	however,	successive	announcements	have	frozen	the	CPF	at	its	134	
2017	 level	of	£18/tCO2	at	 least	until	2021.	 	While	 this	 suggests	diminished	ambition	 in	 the	 face	of	135	
6	
cost	 sensitivities,	 it	 should	 be	 compared	 to	 an	 EU-ETS	 price	 of	 approximately	 €5/tCO2	 throughout	136	
2016.	137	
Debate	 continues	 about	 the	 floor	 price45–47.	 	Whilst	 it	 has	 been	 effective	 in	 promoting	 the	 switch	138	
from	 coal	 to	 existing	 natural	 gas	 generation,	 it	 has	 failed	 to	 incentivise	 construction	 of	 new	 low-139	
carbon	 generation,	 which	 continue	 to	 require	 other	 forms	 of	 financial	 support.	 	 The	 cost	 to	140	
consumers	 can	 be	 approximated	 from	 the	 left	 panel	 of	 Figure	 4	 as	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 actual	141	
electricity	price,	and	the	estimated	cost	of	the	marginal	fuel	(whichever	is	more	expensive,	gas	and	142	
coal).		We	estimate	the	carbon	price	floor	has	added	in	the	region	of	0.7	p/kWh	to	retail	prices	(~5%)	143	
during	2016,	which	is	comparable	government	analysis48	and	estimates	for	UK	industry49.	This	price	144	
rise	 is	 very	modest	 considering	 the	~25%	 reduction	 in	power	 sector	 emissions	 it	 facilitated	 in	 just	145	
one	year.	146	
	 	
Figure	4:	The	wholesale	price	of	electricity	in	Britain	with	the	competitive	benchmark	based	on	fuel	and	carbon	prices.	a	147	
electricity	prices	are	compared	with	the	estimated	cost	of	generation	from	coal	and	gas	with	no	carbon	price.	b	shows	the	148	
comparison	 including	the	prevailing	carbon	price	 in	Britain,	along	with	the	share	of	total	electricity	generation	from	coal.	149	
Electricity	prices	are	 from	the	day-ahead	spot	market.	Generation	cost	consists	of	 fuel	combusted	 (divided	by	conversion	150	
efficiency)	 and	 carbon	 emitted	 (multiplied	 by	 carbon	 price),	 neglecting	 other	 aspects	 such	 as	maintenance	 and	 network	151	
charges.	 Prices	and	 costs	have	quarterly	 resolution,	 the	 coal	generation	 share	has	annual	 resolution.	 	Carbon	price	data	152	
from	refs.	44		and		50	,	fuel	price	data	from	ref.	51,	electricity	price	and	coal	share	data	from	ref.	12.	153	
The	costs	of	electricity	generation	are	shown	in	Figure	4,	highlighting	the	falling	cost	of	gas	relative	154	
to	coal	since	2014.	However,	coal	would	still	be	the	cheapest	form	of	generation	with	the	European	155	
ETS	 carbon	 price,	 despite	 the	 sharp	 rise	 in	 international	 coal	 prices	 through	 2016	 (due	 to	 China	156	
cutting	 production	 by	 10%)52.	 	 Instead,	 the	 CPF	 allowed	 gas	 generation	 to	 become	 equivalent	 or	157	
cheaper	 since	 the	 beginning	 2016	 and	 displace	 coal’s	 share	 of	 generation.	 In	 terms	 of	 historical	158	
precedence,	 the	 carbon	 price	 in	 Britain	 has	 been	 raised	 back	 to	 its	 level	 in	 2008.	 	 In	 the	 rest	 of	159	
Europe,	it	remains	at	just	one-third	of	its	peak.	160	
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Fuel	 switching	 is	 not	 unidirectional,	 and	 could	 equally	 be	 reversed	while	 coal	 generation	 capacity	161	
remains	available	over	the	coming	years,	helped	by	capacity	market	payments.		All	this	would	take	is	162	
another	 shift	 in	 relative	 fuel	 prices	 or	 a	 weakening	 of	 the	 carbon	 price	 to	 increase	 coal’s	 annual	163	
market	share.	164	
Leaving	the	markets	to	it	165	
Britain’s	 experience	 shows	 that	 liberal	markets	 can	 rapidly	 adjust	 to	well-timed	well-aimed	 policy	166	
signals.		Policy	is	not	an	essential	ingredient	though,	as	America	demonstrates	that	a	confluence	of	167	
market	 factors	 can	drive	 fuel	 switching	alone,	 albeit	 at	 a	 slower	pace.53–55	 	 Since	2005	natural	 gas	168	
prices	have	 fallen	70%	compared	 to	25%	 for	 coal	due	 to	 increased	production	and	 the	 inability	 to	169	
export	 shale	 gas5	 (due	 to	 insufficient	 infrastructure).	 This	 has	 lowered	 the	 US	 average	 carbon	170	
intensity	of	electricity	by	a	quarter	(see	Figure	1),	with	a	7%	swing	from	coal	to	gas	occurring	in	2015,	171	
reducing	power	sector	emissions	by	around	133	Mt56.	172	
The	political	landscape	changed	with	the	election	of	President	Trump	in	November	2016,	suggesting	173	
ongoing	tensions	between	Federal	efforts	to	revive	an	ailing	coal	sector,	and	many	State	policies	that	174	
focus	 on	 decarbonisation.	 Carbon	 pricing	 at	 a	 federal	 level	which	would	 accelerate	 fuel	 switching	175	
from	 coal	 to	 natural	 gas	 is	 therefore	 improbable	 under	 the	 Trump	 administration.	 The	 US	 has	 a	176	
complex	 range	 of	 political	 drivers	 from	 federal	 environmental	 regulations	 impacted	 by	 sector	177	
lobbying,	 layered	with	 further	 political	 drivers	 at	 state	 level.	Within	 this	melange	 of	 political	 and	178	
market	 forces,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 suggest	 future	 levels	of	 fuel	 switching	with	any	degree	of	 certainty.	179	
Federal	 regulations	have	 switched	back	and	 forth	 to	 favour	different	 technologies,	which	 suggests	180	
the	benefit	of	having	legal	multi-decadal	targets	to	aim	for.	Britain	is	not	immune	from	lobbying	and	181	
switching	regulations	back	and	forth	to	suit	different	technologies,	but	 it	has	pioneered	the	use	of	182	
long-term	 legal	 targets	 in	 the	2008	Climate	Change	Act38.	This	has	kept	 the	 long-term	ambition	on	183	
track	 regardless	 of	 the	 change	 of	 policy	makers	 and	 the	 political	 pressure	 to	 rescind	 policies	 that	184	
become	unpopular	with	core	voters.	185	
Potential	for	fuel	switching	in	Germany	186	
Germany	 is	 regarded	as	a	champion	of	 renewable	energy	 for	 its	extensive	 investment	 in	wind	and	187	
solar	power.		However,	it	has	had	limited	success	in	decarbonising	its	power	sector,	with	emissions	188	
down	15%	since	1990,	compared	to	Britain’s	reduction	of	61%.	Figure	5	shows	that	Germany’s	lack	189	
of	progress	is	due	to	continued	reliance	on	lignite	and	hard	coal	for	>40%	of	electricity	supply.	190	
8	
	 	
Figure	5:	Power	 sector	 CO2	 emissions	 in	Germany	 and	Britain,	 broken	 down	by	 fuel	 source.	 	 The	 carbon	 price	 in	 each	191	
country	is	overlaid,	showing	the	marked	difference	since	the	introduction	of	the	UK’s	Carbon	Price	Floor	in	2013.		It	 is	our	192	
view	that	this	was	the	major	additional	factor	that	caused	the	rapid	shift	from	coal	to	natural	gas	generation	after	2013.	193	
data	from	refs.	17	and	18,	emissions	intensities	from	refs.	32	and	12,	and	carbon	prices	from	refs.	44	and		50.	194	
Germany	 is	 self-sufficient	 for	 lignite	but	 imports	 89%	of	 its	 hard	 coal57,	 as	 its	 geology	makes	 local	195	
production	 internationally	 uncompetitive.	 	 Import	 dependency	 for	 natural	 gas	 is	 similarly	 90%,	196	
although	only	one-sixth	of	demand	 is	 from	the	power	sector	as	gas	 is	primarily	used	for	heating18.		197	
Around	 15bcm/year	 (~150	 TWh/year)	 of	 spare	 capacity	 exists	 in	 the	 Nordstream	 pipeline	 for	198	
increased	 gas	 supplies58,	 with	 an	 additional	 55bcm/year	 (540	 TWh/year)	 if	 Nordstream	 2	 is	199	
constructed.	 At	 a	 national	 level,	 it	 seems	 the	 fuel	 supply	 infrastructure	 has	 the	 potential	 to	200	
accommodate	significant	levels	of	fuel	switching.	201	
However,	 several	 reasons	 temper	 Germany’s	 desire	 to	 take	 this	 route,	 not	 least	 the	 security	202	
implications	of	swapping	indigenous	lignite	to	imported	natural	gas.		Germany’s	decision	to	remove	203	
nuclear	generation	provides	an	additional	challenge:	installing	60	GW	of	wind	and	solar	power	in	the	204	
last	 decade	 has	 done	 little	 more	 than	 offset	 the	 lost	 output	 from	 the	 10	 GW	 of	 retired	 nuclear	205	
power32.	 	 Both	 considerations	 were	 not	 applicable	 to	 Britain,	 which	 has	 no	 lignite	 mines,	 and	 in	206	
contrast	 to	 Germany,	 is	 embracing	 new	 nuclear	 build.	 Germany	 is	 a	 fascinating	 interaction	 of	207	
political	 economy	 interests,	 with	 a	 lignite	 lobby	 that	 capitalises	 on	 security	 of	 supply	 and	 cost	208	
arguments	for	Germany’s	energy	transition.	However,	without	the	development	of	Carbon	Capture	209	
and	Storage	in	Germany	(which	currently	seems	highly	challenging)	at	some	point	lignite	generation	210	
will	 be	 impossible	 to	 reconcile	 with	 decarbonisation	 targets,	 and	 Britain’s	 experience	 shows	 this	211	
could	be	rapidly	reduced	given	Germany’s	pre-built	but	underutilised	gas	generation	capacity.	212	
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Germany	has	24	GW	of	 gas-fired	power	 stations,	 compared	 to	28	GW	of	hard	 coal	 and	21	GW	of	213	
lignite32.	 	 In	 recent	 years,	 nearly-new	 gas	 power	 stations	 have	 been	 mothballed	 after	 proving	214	
unprofitable,	and	eventually	exported	to	the	Middle	East59.		This	is	because	gas	capacity	lies	mostly	215	
unused,	with	18%	utilisation	vs.	40%	for	hard	coal	and	74%	for	lignite	in	201618.	 	An	additional	155	216	
TWh	of	electricity	could	be	produced	if	this	gas	generation	capacity	were	utilised	at	80%,	sufficient	217	
to	completely	eliminate	hard	coal	plus	four-tenths	of	lignite	production,	which	would	cut	Germany’s	218	
power	sector	emissions	by	around	a	quarter,	or	62	MtCO2	per	year.	219	
Greater	 emissions	 savings	 would	 result	 from	 displacing	 lignite.	 	 However,	 this	 would	 increase	220	
primary	energy	import	dependency;	whereas	switching	from	hard	coal	to	natural	gas	would	simply	221	
switch	one	type	of	energy	imports	for	another,	introducing	a	different	set	of	risks.	222	
Potential	for	fuel	switching	globally	223	
Quantifying	 an	 accurate	 global	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 requires	 a	 detailed	 country-by-country	224	
analysis	 of	 infrastructure,	 generation	 and	 demand,	 prices	 and	 policies.	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 broad	225	
order-of-magnitude	can	be	estimated	using	statistics	for	annual	generation	and	installed	generating	226	
capacity.	 	 We	 estimate	 the	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 in	 the	 30	 largest	 coal	 consuming	 nations	227	
(covering	 97%	 of	 global	 coal	 capacity)	 by	 compiling	 the	 amount	 of	 coal	 and	 lignite	 generation	 in	228	
2015,	 and	 comparing	 this	 to	 the	additional	 generation	 that	 could	 come	 from	gas	 in	 each	 country.		229	
This	 is	 based	 on	 existing,	 underutilised	 gas	 generation;	 disregarding	 the	 option	 of	 building	 new	230	
capacity.		The	maximum	gas	generation	potential	assumes	that	combined-cycle	gas	turbines	(CCGTs)	231	
could	run	up	to	80%	utilisation	(limited	by	availability	and	downtime),	while	open-cycle	(OCGTs)	and	232	
steam	boiler	stations	would	be	limited	to	0–40%	utilisation	(due	to	economic	rationale).		Displacing	233	
coal	with	single-cycle	(rather	than	combined-cycle)	gas	stations	would	yield	half	the	carbon	savings	234	
due	 to	 their	 lower	 efficiency	 and	 thus	 higher	 carbon	 intensity.	 	We	 assume	CO2	 emissions	 of	 405	235	
g/kWh	 for	CCGTs	and	710	g/kWh	 for	OCGTs,	 relative	 to	1025±55	g/kWh	 for	national	 coal	 fleets14.		236	
Sources,	details	and	justification	are	given	as	supplementary	information.	237	
Figure	 6a	 shows	 the	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 across	 the	 OECD	 and	 coal-reliant	 developing	238	
countries.	 	 Many	 European	 countries	 (including	 Britain)	 have	 over-built	 power	 systems	 with	239	
sufficient	 idle	gas	capacity	 to	completely	eliminate	coal,	at	 least	at	 the	annual	aggregate	 level.	 	Of	240	
the	largest	coal	consumers,	Russia	and	the	US	could	convert	40–50%	of	their	coal	generation	to	gas,	241	
but	China	and	India	could	only	displace	6–12%	due	to	the	vast	scale	of	their	coal	fleets.	242	
Poland	depends	on	solid	fuels	for	over	90%	of	its	electricity,	and	lacks	the	pre-existing	gas	plants	to	243	
take	over	market	share60.		Japan	is	still	gripped	by	a	capacity	shortage	in	the	wake	of	the	Fukushima	244	
disaster	and	shutdown	of	its	nuclear	fleet,	thus	its	gas	stations	are	running	close	to	capacity	already.	245	
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Figure	6b	shows	that	if	fuel	switching	was	fully	realised	in	these	30	countries,	annual	emissions	could	246	
fall	by	0.8–1.2	GtCO2,	around	3%	of	global	emissions.		Reductions	in	China,	India	and	Europe	amount	247	
to	440	MtCO2	per	year,	and	are	insensitive	to	the	utilisation	of	single-cycle	plants	as	these	make	up	248	
only	a	fifth	of	their	gas	fleet.		The	mitigation	potential	in	the	US	and	Russia	is	more	sensitive	to	the	249	
assumed	utilisation,	as	OCGTs	and	steam	boilers	form	half	their	gas	capacity.	250	
	 	
Figure	6:	Estimation	of	the	carbon	mitigation	potential	from	fuel	switching	in	30	countries.		a	Comparison	of	output	from	251	
coal	power	stations	in	2015	with	the	potential	for	additional	gas	generation,	if	existing	combined-cycle	gas	plants	operated	252	
at	80%	utilisation	and	single-cycle	plants	at	20%	(with	bars	showing	0%	to	40%).	 	b	The	annual	greenhouse-gas	emission	253	
savings	 if	 the	 identified	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 was	 realised	 across	 these	 countries,	 showing	 the	 sensitivity	 to	 the	254	
utilisation	of	single-cycle	gas	plants.	In	panel	a,	countries	are	identified	using	their	two-letter	ISO	codes,	and	diagonal	lines	255	
highlight	the	share	of	coal	that	could	be	displaced	by	gas.		Colours	are	used	to	group	countries	into	the	geographic	regions	256	
listed	in	the	legend	of	panel	b.		The	four	countries	with	zero	potential	for	additional	gas	output	are	shown	below	the	axis.		257	
Data	from	sources	listed	in	the	supplementary	information.	258	
No	Silver	Bullet	259	
While	 this	analysis	 is	only	a	 first-order	approximation,	 it	 suggests	 that	 fuel	 switching	 in	 the	power	260	
sector	 could	 provide	 a	 significant	 boost	 to	 global	 decarbonisation.	 	 However,	 fuel	 switching	 is	 no	261	
silver	bullet,	and	many	barriers	can	explain	why	only	a	small	percentage	of	the	estimated	potential	262	
has	been	realised	thus	far.	263	
Fuel	 switching	 will	 change	 supply-chain	 and	 energy	 security	 risks,	 and	 in	 many	 countries	 would	264	
create	 political	 tensions	 by	 increasing	 import	 dependency	 for	 primary	 energy.	 	 Although	265	
employment	in	the	coal	sector	has	fallen	dramatically	in	many	western	countries,	policies	which	are	266	
seen	to	further	decimate	domestic	mining	industries	will	 face	opposition,	as	seen	in	America.	Over	267	
the	 longer	 term,	 politicians	must	 grapple	with	 the	 consequences	 of	 transitioning	 away	 from	 solid	268	
fuels;	 notably	 how	 to	 engage	 and	 retrain	 affected	mining	 communities	 where	 coal	 production	 is	269	
culturally	significant,	as	well	as	a	source	of	employment.	270	
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There	are	also	risks	with	carbon	 leakage	 in	highly	 interconnected	markets	such	as	Germany61,62.	 	A	271	
strong	 carbon	price	 to	 promote	 fuel	 switching	 can	 reduce	within-country	 emissions,	 but	may	 also	272	
shift	 electricity	 production	 (and	 thus	 carbon	 emissions)	 to	 areas	 subject	 to	 a	 lower	 carbon	 price.	273	
Britain	now	imports	high-carbon	electricity	from	the	Netherlands,	where	coal	usage	increased	40%	274	
and	 generators	 pay	 one-fifth	 the	 carbon	 price.	 	 Supranational	 harmonisation	 of	 carbon	 pricing	 is	275	
needed	to	avoid	the	'offshoring'	of	power	sector	emissions.		Other	considerations,	such	as	the	level	276	
of	methane	leakage	in	the	natural	gas	supply	chain	must	also	be	carefully	assessed63,64.	277	
Carbon	pricing	however	 is	not	a	blanket	policy	that	will	work	everywhere.	 	 In	countries	which	 lack	278	
the	gas	infrastructure	such	as	Poland	or	Japan,	raising	a	carbon	price	would	in	the	short	term	be	no	279	
less	 blunt	 than	 a	 blanket	 tax	 on	 electricity.	 	 In	 the	 longer	 term,	 a	 careful	 balance	 is	 needed	 to	280	
redirect	how	existing	infrastructure	could	be	used	without	going	so	far	as	to	incentivise	building	new	281	
gas	 infrastructure	and	avoidable	 carbon	 lock-in.	 	 If	no	more	carbon	emitting	electricity	generation	282	
can	be	built	 for	a	2°C	temperature	rise	 to	remain	 likely65,	 the	distinction	between	utilising	existing	283	
gas	generation	versus	investing	in	additional	capacity	is	of	critical	importance66,67.	284	
Conclusions	285	
Switching	between	fossil	fuels	can	only	ever	be	a	temporary	stepping	stone.		Its	potential	is	bounded	286	
by	 the	 scale	 of	 existing	 coal	 and	 gas	 infrastructure,	 and	 natural	 gas	 is	 incompatible	 with	 deep	287	
decarbonisation68,69	unless	carbon	capture	and	storage	emerges	from	its	‘valley	of	death’10.		If	spare	288	
capacity	 already	 exists,	 then	 fuel	 switching	 does	 not	 require	 several	 years	 to	wind	 up	 to	material	289	
emissions	 savings,	 unlike	 other	 key	 options	 (renewables,	 nuclear,	 efficiency	 improvements).	 	 The	290	
‘quick	win’	is	provided	simply	by	using	pre-existing	infrastructure	more	effectively.	291	
Britain’s	example	highlights	the	effectiveness	under	certain	key	circumstances	of	placing	a	modest,	292	
but	stable,	£18/tCO2	on	carbon,	and	the	speed	with	which	the	power	sector	generation	changed	in	293	
response	to	such	a	signal;	it	switched	15%	of	its	generation	mix	(45	TWh)	in	a	single	year,	saving	25	294	
MtCO2.	 Fuel	 switching	 can	 demonstrably	 achieve	 very	 rapid	 carbon	 reductions.	 In	 comparison	295	
renewables	 took	six	years	 to	grow	from	4%	to	19%	of	Britain’s	generation	 (a	45	TWh/yr	 increase),	296	
saving	approximately12	 22	MtCO2.	 	 It	will	 be	 at	 least	 10	 years	before	new	nuclear	 capacity	will	 be	297	
built	in	Britain59,	which	would	require	three	projects	the	size	of	Hinkley	Point	C	to	save	27	MtCO2	per	298	
year70	to	fuel	switch	from	natural	gas	(as	coal	will	no	longer	be	on	the	system).	299	
Fuel	switching	can	also	be	a	cost-effective	and	convenient	form	of	decarbonisation.		If	driven	solely	300	
by	market	forces	it	will	lower	bills;	if	policy	support	alters	the	balance	between	closely-priced	fuels,	it	301	
can	have	minimal	 impact	on	consumers,	as	seen	 in	Britain.	 	Natural	gas	 retains	 the	energy	system	302	
benefits	 of	 being	 a	 fuel:	 controllable	 and	 dispatchable	 generation,	 and	 extensive	 storage	303	
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infrastructure	with	days	to	weeks	of	capacity,	rather	than	minutes	to	hours	for	electrochemical	and	304	
thermal	storage71,72.	 	Controllable	flexibility	is	 increasingly	desirable	to	accommodate	greater	levels	305	
of	 variable	 renewable	 energy	 generation,	 especially	 so	 if	 coal	 generation	 is	 simultaneously	 being	306	
retired.	307	
Anthropogenic	carbon	emissions	had	almost	plateaued73.		The	next,	momentous	step,	for	emissions	308	
to	decrease,	could	be	catalysed	by	a	concerted	global	effort	to	switch	away	from	coal	to	natural	gas.		309	
Our	 initial	 examination	 suggests	 the	 top	 30	 coal	 consuming	 countries	 could	 prevent	 1	 GT	 of	 CO2	310	
emissions	from	entering	the	atmosphere	annually;	with	a	central	estimate	that	20%	of	the	world’s	311	
coal	could	be	switched	to	gas	using	existing,	under-utilised	infrastructure	(the	range	is	13%	with	no	312	
OCGT	up	to	27%	with	them	running	at	40%	utilisation).		This	provides	an	immediate	benefit	to	slow	313	
the	increase	in	cumulative	carbon	emissions,	buying	all-important	time	for	other	sectors	to	catch	up,	314	
and	providing	cleaner	electricity	with	which	to	decarbonise	them.		Any	effort	to	front-load	emissions	315	
reductions	will	ease	the	pressure	on	future	generations	who	are	faced	with	removing	emissions	back	316	
out	 of	 the	 atmosphere74.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 vital	 to	 cumulative	 emissions	 that	 the	 gains	 of	 early	317	
decarbonisation	from	fuel	switching	are	not	squandered	by	the	extended	use	of	gas	generation	as	a	318	
substitute	for	the	necessary	increase	in	low-carbon	technologies.	319	
The	 potential	 for	 rapid	 and	material	 global	 emissions	 reductions	 appears	 to	 have	 gone	 unnoticed	320	
thus	far;	it	is	about	time	that	the	benefits	of	fuel	switching	deserved	greater	attention.	321	
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